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Flipping through the morning’s correspondence deposited 
in his in-box, Tom Esquire shuffles past envelopes containing 
plane tickets to a client meeting in New York, an invitation to 
speak at a conference in Washington, and a chipper notice 
announcing his twenty-five year high school reunion.  Arriving 
at a gusset-sized envelope from a nearby venture capital firm, 
Tom stops his shuffling.  He slices through the creased flap 
with his Waterford crystal letter opener and pulls forth the 
draft offering statement for his new client, Cashout-Dot-Com.  
Thumbing through the first few pages of the statement, Tom 
smiles at how the success of this new client will provide him 
with a proportional windfall.  Tom’s compensation package for 
his work on the deal includes eight percent of the stock that he 
arranged to issue to the incorporators of the company.  
Cashout-Dot-Com received its Angel financing and substantial 
venture financing in its first venture capital round.  The 
venture capitalists are eager to take the company public.  The 
market for IPO issues seems strong, and the public offering is 
set at 100 million dollars with the closing to occur in two 
weeks.  Tom is overwhelmed with pride in helping to facilitate 
this potential success, and even more overwhelmed at the 
prospect of finally breaking free of the shackles of his personal 
line of credit, so frequently strained since the spring that his 
daughter was accepted at Stanford. 
Just then, Tom receives a telephone call from Washington.  
Cashout-Dot-Com’s principal patent application has just been 
made the subject of an interference proceeding with a patent 
application filed by a competitor dot com company.  
Furthermore, the Patent Office has named Cashout-Dot-Com’s 
inventor as the junior party.  As a junior party, Tom’s client 
will have the burden of proof to show that his company 
invented first.  Tom looks more intently at the draft offering 
statement on his desk.  The draft statement includes a section 
on patent filings, but nothing about the interference.  
“Investors will want to know about this,” Tom thinks to 
himself.  Then the phone rings again.  It’s Victor Ventura, 
senior partner in the venture capital firm.  Tom tells him about 
the pending interference. 
Victor exclaims, “We don’t have to put that in there 
because you’re going to win that one for us, aren’t you Tom?” 
Tom explains, “As junior party, this is a tough hill to 
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climb.” 
Victor’s response is immediate and authoritative: “If we 
put THAT in the statement, this deal may not go.  We’ve got to 
have an opinion letter from a top-drawer firm like yours that 
we will win the interference.” 
The phone call ends.  Tom slumps in his chair.  If he writes 
a strong opinion letter, the client will think that his firm will 
win the interference.  If he hedges too much, the deal might not 
go.  He doesn’t even have enough time before the closing to 
interview all the principal individuals, analyze the competitor’s 
legal and factual position, and determine the strength of the 
evidence and the law supporting Cashout-Dot-Com’s date of 
invention.  Tom now realizes that his opinion letter is going to 
be a second-class piece of work.  He wishes that he could just 
pick up the phone, call Victor and say, “No, we’re not going to 
give an opinion like that.” 
The phone rings again.  It’s Cashout-Dot-Com’s founder.  
He says, “Tom, I just talked with Mr. Ventura.  He said that 
this market may have only a short window for doing this IPO, 
and that you are working on getting the disclosure issues 
resolved in time.  I’m glad we have you to solve these 
problems.” 
Tom’s throat suddenly feels very dry.  He can hardly choke 
out a soft “thank you,” before hanging up.  Tom now realizes his 
problem.  If he had this work on an hourly basis, he would have 
told Victor “no way!” without much hesitation ten minutes ago.  
After all, he has walked away from other client schemes in the 
past even though the lost fees could have amounted to twenty-
five, fifty, or even a hundred thousand dollars.  But this one 
was much harder.  In two weeks he would go from a barely 
positive net worth to never having to work again.  He would 
COUNT.  He would be one of the PLAYERS, not just a 
spectator in the game.  He could be worth five to eight million 
at the moment of issuance, and maybe worth twenty million at 
the end of the first day’s run-up. 
Tom knows what is wrong.  He has lost his independence.  
He can no longer provide effective legal advice.  He’s not 
practicing a profession now.  He’s just trying to make money. 
This scene illustrates the tremendous pressures that may 
unduly influence a lawyer’s decisions.  The rules of ethics that 
guide lawyers help define what the public should be able to 
expect from lawyers they retain.  The above scenario 
demonstrates how a lawyer becomes distracted from these 
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rules by the very real and powerful influences of an 
entrepreneurial culture.  This article explores several specific 
dangers that arise in this culture when a lawyer is expected to 
provide impartial professional advice, either from a position 
inside or outside of the enterprise. 
 
I. PITFALLS IN TAKING EQUITY AS A FORM OF 
PAYMENT 
 
Scenario: NewCo is preparing to go public.  NewCo has 
minimal capital, negligible sales, no contracts, but is on the 
verge of acquiring $100 million via investors eager to add a 
high-risk technology start-up to their portfolio.  NewCo has 
retained Counsel to facilitate its initial public offering.  
Without funds to pay cash for its legal fee, NewCo has offered 
Counsel a five percent equity share in NewCo.  Counsel eagerly 
accepts the shares in exchange for traditional hourly billing.  
NewCo is two weeks away from going public, and Counsel is 
two weeks away from becoming a millionaire.1  The challenge 
for Counsel is to provide independent, unbiased advice and 
avoid the temptation to simply rush ahead toward the riches 
that will certainly follow the IPO. 
Historically, lawyers have participated with clients in 
making investments and in taking ownership interests in small 
businesses.2  Under the current legal climate, however, the 
 
 1. The prospects of earning millions of dollars overnight is an exciting 
reality for some firms that have invested in their clients.  The top five first-day 
IPO gains in 1999 for law firms that have invested in clients taking their stock 
public are as follows: Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati’s (“Wilson Sonsini”) 
2,068,944 shares of Webvan were valued at $51,475,327 at the end of the first 
day of the stock trading; Wilson Sonsini’s 102,584 shares of VA Linux were 
valued at $24,543,222 at the end of the first day of the stock trading; Wilson 
Sonsini’s 273,773 shares of Ask Jeeves were valued at $17,778,819 at the end 
of the first day of the stock trading; Hughes & Luce’s 402,552 shares of Perot 
Systems were valued at $17,728,512 at the end of the first day of the stock 
trading; and Brandes Naschitz & Co.’s 863,997 shares of Backweb 
Technologies were valued at $17,012,101 at the end of the first day of the stock 
trading.  See Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. J. 36 
(February 2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Grievance Committee of the Fairfield County Bar v. Leo 
Nevas, 96 A.2d 802 (Conn. 1953), where the defendant helped the complainant 
set up a corporation in which defendant took control of 40 percent of the issued 
stock.  Id. at 803-04.  The trial court found that defendant was not guilty of 
unprofessional conduct, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed this 
decision under an abuse of discretion standard of review.  Id. at 805-06.  The 
trial court specifically noted that defendant “had concealed no material fact 
2001] “RUSH TO RICHES” 55 
 
scenario where a lawyer accepts equity in a client as a means of 
payment (as described above) is fraught with ethical pitfalls.  
This type of transaction may expose a lawyer to malpractice 
liability and sanctions from an ethics board, in addition to 
invalidation of the transaction.3  Having an equity stake in a 
client can compromise a lawyer’s independent judgment and 
strain a longstanding rapport with that client.4  Further, only a 
small portion of the big-name technology IPOs ever turn out to 
be profitable.5  Thus, it may be both unethical and highly risky 
to tread the path of a client equity holder.  Although it may be 
possible to create an equity relationship with a client,6 the 
following section discusses the major potential pitfalls, many of 
which have been addressed in the recently-issued Formal 
Opinion 418 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility (“Opinion 418”).7 
 
 
from the complainant.”  Id. at 805.  Despite finding the defendant innocent of 
unprofessional conduct, the trial court stated that: 
I feel that Mr. Nevas, the respondent, deserves criticism for becoming 
involved personally and financially in his client’s business.  There was a 
complete absence of prudence and good taste.  His involvement apparently 
became inextricable after he had put in the first $5,000.  From then on 
everything he did sought to save the money he had improvidently already 
paid in. He should not have done that. 
Id.  The appellate court noted that, although the trial court found respondent 
innocent, it “might well have decided that a public reprimand should be 
administered to the defendant.”  Id. at 806. 
 3. See infra Parts I.A-C. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 38-39 (“With all the attention paid to the 
monster gains in the Internet IPO market, few people are paying attention to 
the losers. . . . Despite the jackpots that many investors make, observers 
estimate that in the high-stakes game of technology, losers outnumber the 
winners by as much as 20 to 1.  And that doesn’t take into account the 
companies that make it to the public market but fail a few months down the 
road.”). 
 6. Indeed, some commentators encourage these types of transactions.  
See, e.g., Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance and Incentives 
Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Lawyers, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 330 (1999) (“Allowing compensation of lawyers with client stock or 
options should be encouraged not only because it is market-driven, but also 
because it adds value to the client, the economy, and society.”); Gwyneth E. 
McAlpine, Note, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be Allowed to 
Invest in Their Clients’ Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 549, 596 (1999) (“Because of 
the benefit to the client, the transactions should not be discouraged by 
ineffectual procedural requirements.”). 
 7. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 
418 (2000), reprinted in the Appendix. 
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A. MATERIAL LIMITATIONS BY A LAWYER’S OWN INTERESTS 
 
A lawyer who acquires stock in a client in lieu of a cash 
payment must ensure that his actions are in accord with Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b).  Rule 1.7(b) prohibits 
a lawyer from representing a client if the representation “may 
be materially limited . . . by the lawyer’s own interests.”8  If the 
representation may be materially limited, the lawyer must 
decline representation or else satisfy two additional 
requirements: the lawyer must reasonably believe that “the 
representation will not be adversely affected,” and the client 
must consent to the representation after consultation.9 
The ABA Committee’s Opinion 418 offers a hypothetical 
that is very similar to the NewCo and Counsel scenario.10  
Opinion 418 describes a situation in which an attorney’s 
ownership of stock in a corporation may conflict with the 
attorney’s responsibilities to the corporation.11  For example, 
when the attorney is rendering an opinion on behalf of the 
corporation to potential investors, the attorney may have a 
duty to advise the corporation to reveal material adverse 
information, even though the revelation may cause the 
potential investor to withdraw.12  Opinion 418 instructs that in 
this scenario, when the attorney’s financial interest runs 
counter to the duty to provide independent, unbiased advice, 
the attorney must “subordinat[e] any economic incentive” that 
may result from owning equity in the corporation.13  Then the 




 8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (2000).  Rule 
1.7(b) states: 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may 
be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) 
the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple 
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the 
advantages and risks involved. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Formal Op. 418. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Formal Op. 418. 
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Drawing out the hypothetical even further, Opinion 418 
posits a scenario in which the attorney’s stock in the 
corporation is also the attorney’s major asset, and a failure to 
obtain outside investors would result in a significant financial 
loss to the attorney.15  Opinion 418 warns that the attorney’s 
self-interest likely justifies a reasonable belief that his 
representation may not be independent and unbiased.16  
Opinion 418 provides clear advice in this scenario: “This [self-
interest] would disqualify [the attorney] under Rule 1.7(b) from 
providing the opinion even were the client to consent.”17  Thus, 
not even the consent of a client, after a disclosure of all the 
potential conflicts of interest, would permit an attorney to 
continue representation in that situation.18 
If NewCo’s IPO closes as expected, Counsel stands to 
receive $5 million, which is analogous to the scenario 
considered in Opinion 418.  This potential immediate payoff for 
Counsel provides a powerful incentive for him to compromise 
his independent, unbiased advice in light of the great benefit 
that completion of the transaction will realize for him.  With 
two weeks separating Counsel from a payday large enough for 
him to retire from practice, even an attorney guided by a strong 
ethical compass, with a copy of the Model Rules in hand, would 
find it difficult to instruct a client that it must make a material, 
adverse disclosure or that it would be best to hold off on the 
IPO until certain issues can be resolved – especially given the 
nebulous nature of the standards of prudence in this area of 
law. 
But what if this particular conflict never materializes?  
What if preparation for the IPO proceeds as planned and 
Counsel is never faced with the decision of having to advise 
NewCo to disclose or postpone?  Is Counsel permitted to 
maintain the significant equity share and continue to represent 
NewCo?  The formal opinion is clear on this point: if the 
attorney’s self-interest justifies a reasonable belief that his 
representation may not be independent and unbiased, then 
under Rule 1.7(b) the attorney must decline representation.19  If 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id.  Model Rule 1.7(b) permits an attorney to continue representation 
only if “the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely 
affected.”  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (2000).  One 
learned treatise notes that Model Rule 1.7(b) “applies whenever 
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Counsel in this instance must decline representation where no 
actual conflict materializes, then, a fortiori, in a situation 
where Counsel finds himself revisiting his advice to the client 
based on his own personal interest, and realizes that his 
potential financial gains are skewing the disinterest of his 
advice, the representation most certainly must be declined. 
The pitfalls of stock ownership are not unique to outside 
counsel.  As an example, if the NewCo and Counsel scenario is 
slightly altered so that Counsel is working in-house for NewCo 
and owns equity shares or possesses stock options such that 
NewCo’s impending IPO could compromise Counsel’s 
independent, unbiased advice, then Counsel must decline 
representation.  However, inside counsel are not permitted the 
luxury of simply choosing not to represent a client − indeed, by 
definition they only have one client.  Inside counsel’s declining 
representation would entail quitting their jobs and risking 
financial security for themselves and their families.  In 
contrast, outside attorneys with multiple other clients can more 
easily avoid a potential conflict by declining representation and 
shifting their time to other clients with available work. 
What ethical choice does inside counsel have with respect 
to representing her only client?  She has the duty to inform her 
management, whenever asked to advise the company in any 
matter in which inside counsel’s ability to provide independent 
advice might be compromised by economic exigencies, to 
explain the potential conflict, and to suggest that management 
consider retaining an independent lawyer to advise the 
company in the matter.  Such situations might arise, for 
example, when she is asked to advise on the sufficiency of 
preparations and disclosures for an initial public offering, or 
when she is asked to handle a subpoena issued to the company 
in a government investigation, or when she is asked to advise 
as to the fairness of the CEO’s compensation package. 
Not only are the options available to inside counsel more 
constrained, the conflict of interest as described in the NewCo 
scenario can arise more subtly and with greater frequency, 
even when stock options are not involved.  When the CEO of 
NewCo instructs Counsel to execute a business plan, Counsel 
 
representation of a client may be impaired or limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to others, and does not depend upon the existence of an actual 
adverse relationship, ‘direct’ or not.”  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., 1 THE 
LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT § 1.7, at 249 (2d ed. 1998) (emphasis in original). 
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feels a natural compulsion to assist the CEO in executing the 
plan, even if the legality of certain steps in the plan might 
otherwise trouble him.  Counsel may feel a more powerful 
compulsion than an outside counsel, who is not so dependent on 
the personal goodwill of the CEO for his family’s immediate 
sustenance.  The CEO’s influence over Counsel’s status at 
NewCo, and the inherent compulsion that Counsel feels to 
align himself to the goals of the CEO, may be analogous to the 
conflict of interest that Counsel feels when he is two weeks 
away from turning his five percent equity into five million 
dollars.  If Counsel feels any propensity whatsoever to act 
against his independent professional advice, regardless of 
whether an actual conflict ever materializes, then Counsel is in 
the same situation as an equity-holding attorney who is 
advising his client on going public.  Again, Opinion 418 is clear 
on the action that must be taken: if the attorney’s self-interest 
justifies a reasonable belief that his representation may not be 
independent and unbiased, then under Rule 1.7(b) the attorney 
must decline representation.20 
In another permutation of the Counsel and NewCo 
hypothetical, NewCo’s founder and CEO (“Founder”) cashes out 
his equity and begins another business venture.  As an outside 
attorney, Counsel handles the legal aspects of the business 
transaction, in addition to drafting the noncompete agreement 
that restrains Founder from developing any technology for the 
next three years that would compete with NewCo.  One year 
after the equity buyout, Founder creates a new restaurant 
chain named Cheese-E-Chuck.  Because of the relationship that 
Founder developed with Counsel while at NewCo, Founder 
calls Counsel and asks him to assist in his new business 
endeavor.  Counsel is eager to handle Founder’s work.  
Founder’s innovative ideas resulted in the success at NewCo, 
and Counsel believes that representing Founder in his new 
business endeavor with Cheese-E-Chuck could be very 
lucrative. 
Before Counsel accepts Founder’s offer, Counsel must 
consider whether the ethical rules permit this representation.  
When Founder worked at NewCo, he was the majority 
shareholder and CEO and thus spoke for the company.  
Counsel took orders from Founder, and it was Founder that 
instructed Counsel to prepare the buyout transaction.  
 
 20. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 
418 (2000). 
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Although Counsel perceived Founder as the client, his client 
was actually the business entity NewCo.  When Counsel 
evaluates whether he can represent Founder after his 
departure from NewCo, Counsel must consider whether there 
are any potential conflicts between NewCo and Founder that 
may adversely affect his representation of both parties.  If 
NewCo’s new owner forms a belief that Founder’s warranties 
were not fulfilled or if some controversy arises with respect to 
the conduct of the business prior to the change in ownership, 
Counsel will be placed in a position of being unable to represent 
Founder.21  For example, if Cheese-E-Chuck develops into a 
competitor of NewCo within the next two years, NewCo may 
have a claim for breach of contract against Founder.  Since 
Counsel represented NewCo in the drafting of the contract, this 
prior representation would make Counsel ineligible to 
represent Founder. 
Another conflict could arise if NewCo is sued for producing 
a defective product.  Counsel may have reviewed a safety 
analysis while working for Founder and NewCo.  Although 
Counsel’s personal knowledge of Founder’s actions while at 
NewCo would be an advantage to NewCo in investigating the 
products liability claim, Counsel’s current representation of 
Founder may disqualify Counsel from assisting NewCo.22  Thus, 
Counsel must carefully consider any other potential conflicts 
before Counsel accepts an offer to work for Founder, or Counsel 
may be risking a future disqualification and potential 
malpractice liability. 
 
B. COMPLIANCE WITH MODEL RULES 1.8(a) AND 1.5(a) 
 
 When Counsel, either as an inside or outside attorney, 
decides to accept equity in NewCo, Counsel must satisfy certain 
ethical “procedural” requirements, in addition to avoiding a 
conflict of interest.  Thus, a lawyer who acquires stock in a 
client corporation in lieu of or in addition to a cash fee enters 
into a business transaction with a client, such that the 
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) must be satisfied.23  Under 
 
 21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (2000). 
 22. See id. 
 23. Model Rule 1.8(a) reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client . . . 
unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest 
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Rule 1.8(a), the transaction must be fair and reasonable; the 
terms must be fully disclosed and explained to the client; the 
transaction must be specified in writing; and the lawyer must 
allow the client to seek independent counsel.24  The following 
section discusses how to properly satisfy the “procedural” 
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a). 
 
1. The Lawyer Must Ensure That the Terms of the 
 Transaction are Fair and Reasonable 
 
 In determining whether Rule 1.8(a)’s first requirement of 
fairness and reasonableness to the client is satisfied, an 
attorney must consider the factors enumerated in Model Rule 
1.5(a).25  Rule 1.5(a) states: 
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.26 
 
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably 
understood by the client;  
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (2000). 
 24. Id. 
 25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (2000).  In 
addition, in evaluating whether the transaction is fair and reasonable, the 
lawyer may have to consider criteria beyond just the factors in Rule 1.5(a).  
For example, in determining reasonableness of a fee when accepting client 
stock, the lawyer also should consider: (i) the liquidity of the stock, (ii) the 
potential for it to be publicly traded, (iii) restrictions on the transferability of 
the stock that may affect its value, and (iv) the stock’s expected value, in light 
of any risks that a proposed patent or trademark may not be granted or 
necessary government approvals may not be received.  See Utah Ethics Adv. 
Op. Comm., Op. 98-13, 1998 WL 863904 * 1 (Dec. 4, 1998). 
 26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (2000). 
62 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:51 
 
Opinion 418 explains that the Rule 1.5(a) criteria must be 
evaluated in determining whether an equity transaction 
between a lawyer and a client is fair and reasonable.27  A 
lawyer must properly balance these factors in bartering his 
legal services for a client’s equity because in a disciplinary 
hearing he will bear the burden of persuasion in demonstrating 
that the transaction was fair and reasonable.28  Further, not 
only is the burden on the lawyer to demonstrate that the 
transaction was fair and reasonable, but the lawyer is held to 
an objective standard, i.e., it is incumbent upon the lawyer to 
take account of all information reasonably ascertainable at the 
time when the agreement for stock acquisition is made.29 
One of the risks in these types of transactions is that 
failing to satisfy the fair and reasonable requirement may 
result in an invalidation of the equity transfer.30  Opinion 418 
provided two case citations as examples of this danger.31  The 
first example described a scenario involving a lawyer for a 
corporation to whom the board had authorized issuance of $33 
million in stock of the corporation in connection with his legal 
services.32  The lawyer was denied recovery of the $33 million in 
stock because he had failed to advise the board of directors to 
consult independent counsel about the transaction.33  The court 
noted that independent counsel could have provided 
information such that “the board of directors might or might 
not have been so enthusiastic about [the lawyer’s offer] as to 
give away three percent of the stock.”34  The second example 
from the Formal Opinion involved a judicial order canceling a 
contract that transferred to a lawyer an undivided one-fourth 
interest in mineral rights in land owned by clients.35  The court 
found that consideration for the conveyance was lacking and 
 
 27. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 
418 (2000). 
 28. See id. (citations omitted). 
 29. See id. (citations omitted). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Passanate v. McWilliams, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1240, 1242, 62 Cal. 
Rptr.2d 298, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 33. See id. at 1248, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d at 302. 
 34. See id. (“Bargaining between the parties might have resulted in 
Passante [the lawyer] settling for just a reasonable finder’s fee. Independent 
counsel would likely have at least reminded the board members of the obvious 
– that a grant of stock to Passante might complicate future capital 
acquisition.”). 
 35. See Matthews v. Spears, 24 So.2d 195, 196-97 (La. App. 1945). 
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that the lawyer did not fully disclose the nature of the 
transaction.36  Both of these cases demonstrate the risks a 
lawyer faces when acquiring a financial interest in a client. 
 
2. The Lawyer Must Ensure that the Terms Are Fully 
 Disclosed and Explained to the Client 
 
Beyond satisfying requirements of fairness and 
reasonableness under Rule 1.8(a), an attorney must fully 
disclose the terms of the transaction in a manner that can be 
reasonably understood by the client.37  Opinion 418 instructs 
that an attorney must “explain the transaction and its potential 
effects on the client-lawyer relationship in a way that the client 
can understand it.”38  As an example, Opinion 418 explains that 
“if the acquisition of stock by the lawyer will create rights 
under corporate by-laws or other agreements that will limit the 
client’s control of the corporation, the lawyer should discuss 
with the client the possible consequences of such an 
arrangement.”39  Again, the formal opinion provided two case 
citations as examples of the possible consequence of failing to 
explain adequately a transaction to the client.40  First, a 
transaction between a lawyer and his client involving the sale 
of the client’s land to a group of investors in which the lawyer 
was a member was referred to disciplinary authority, even 
though the contract between client and lawyer was sufficiently 
fair and reasonable to decree specific performance.41  Second, an 
attorney’s failure to make a full disclosure where he was 
acquiring an interest in his client’s farm land resulted in a 
court-ordered attorney reprimand “even though [the attorney] 
did not act dishonestly or make a profit on the transaction.”42   
 
 36. See id. at 198 (“While there is nothing to prevent an attorney from 
dealing with his client and acquiring from him property or property rights for 
a valuable consideration either in money or for services rendered or to be 
rendered, yet such dealings will be closely scrutinized by the courts, and if it 
appears that the attorney did not fully inform his client of all phases of the 
transaction and its full meaning and import, and any disadvantages that 
might result to the client, the courts will not hesitate to set aside the 
transaction.”) 
 37. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (2000). 
 38. Formal Op. 418. 
 39. Id. (citations omitted). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724, 731-32 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d, 564 
F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 42. Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. 
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3.  The Transaction Must Be Specified in Writing 
 
Opinion 418 explains that full disclosure of the terms of the 
transaction must go beyond a simple discussion with the client: 
“Full disclosure also includes specifying in writing the scope of 
the services to be performed in return for receipt of the stock or 
the opportunity to invest.”43  Further, Opinion 418 states that a 
test for adequate written disclosure is whether the attorney 
employed the writing to make “a good faith effort to explain in 
understandable language the important features of the 
particular arrangement and its material consequences as far as 
reasonably can be ascertained at the time of the stock 
acquisition.”44  Although the ideal writing would contain all the 
salient features of the lawyer-client transaction, Opinion 418 
acknowledges that “compliance with Rule 1.8(a) does not 
require reiteration of details that the client already knows from 
other sources.”45  However, the opinion does warn that “the 
lawyer bears the risk of omitting a term that seems 
unimportant at the time, but later becomes significant because 
[the lawyer] has the burden of showing reasonable compliance 
with Rule 1.8(a)(1).”46 
 
4. The Lawyer Must Allow the Client to Seek Independent 
 Counsel 
 
In addition to fully disclosing the fair and reasonable 
equity transaction and codifying the agreement in writing, the 
attorney must also provide the client with a “reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the 
transaction and [the client] must consent in writing to the 
transaction and its terms.”47  The formal opinion noted that 
“although not required by the Model Rules, the written 
documentation of the transaction should include the lawyer’s 
recommendation to obtain such advice.”48 
 
 
Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895, 899-900 (Iowa 1982). 
 43. Formal Op. 418 (2000). 
 44. Id. (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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C.  CONCLUSION 
 
Although taking equity in a client is permissible under the 
Model Rules, Opinion 418 and the principles outlined above 
suggest that this type of transaction is fraught with ethical 
pitfalls.  As an example of how differently another group of 
professional advisors views investments in client ventures, 
certified public accountants are prohibited from investing in 
their clients.49  The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) Code of Conduct, the rules governing 
certified public accountants, recognizes a per se conflict of 
interest when accountants invest in clients for whom they 
perform auditing services.50  The AICPA Code of Conduct states 
that independence is impaired when the accountant has a 
direct or material indirect financial interest in a client.51  The 
AICPA Code of Conduct requires that the accountant withdraw 
regardless of whether the client is willing to waive the conflict: 
This strict policy highlights the gravity of the potential 
conflict of interest when professional advisors are also 
investors. Clearly, if the accountant has significant equity at 
stake, there is an incentive to make the financial statements 
appear more favorable to the accountant’s investment. The 
AICPA ethical rules are designed to take away that incentive.52 
The Model Rules that guide attorneys, however, approach this 
scenario differently. 
Although the AICPA ethical guidelines prohibit certified 
public accountants from acquiring equity in their clients, the 
Model Rules permit this type of transaction under limited 
circumstances.  The ABA’s formal opinion advises that a great 
deal of care and forethought and a close reading of the Model 
Rules must be employed to properly execute a lawyer-client 
equity transaction.  To apply the requirements of Rules 1.7(b), 
1.8(a), and 1.5(a) to the scenario of NewCo and Counsel, 
Counsel should begin by using the factors in Rule 1.5(a) to 
determine whether receiving the bargained-for stock in lieu of 
cash payments is fair and reasonable.53  Then, Counsel must 
make a full disclosure to NewCo.  Counsel must fully explain 
 
 49. See McAlpine, supra note 6, at 564-65. 
 50. See 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS § 101.01-02, at 4411 (1996). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See McAlpine, supra note 6, at 565. 
 53. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 418 (2000). 
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not only the terms of the stock transfer, but also the potential 
effects on the NewCo-Counsel relationship.54  Counsel should 
inform the client that events subsequent to the stock 
acquisition could create a conflict of interest between Counsel’s 
exercise of independent professional judgment as a lawyer and 
the desire to protect the value of the newly-acquired stock.55  
Counsel also should advise the client that as a consequence of 
such a conflict, he might be required to withdraw as counsel for 
NewCo, or, at a minimum, recommend that another lawyer 
advise NewCo on the matter regarding which Counsel has a 
personal conflict of interest.56 
 
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR INSIDE COUNSEL 
 
Although in-house counsel have been traditionally termed 
“single client” lawyers, these “single client” lawyers are 
increasingly finding themselves mired in impermissible client 
conflicts.57  These impermissible conflicts result from a 
simultaneous representation of multiple clients, such as the 
joint representation of both a company and its constituents, 
including officers, directors, or employees.58  This joint 
representation often stems from a misunderstanding with 
respect to the lawyer’s interaction with individuals within the 
company.59 
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides 
that an attorney-client relationship arises when “a person 
manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer 
provide legal services for the person” and either the lawyer 
“manifests to the person consent to do so” or “the lawyer fails to 
manifest lack of consent to do so, and . . . the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on 
the lawyer to provide the services.”60  In a comment, the 
Restatement specifically addresses the representation of 
organizational clients, such as corporations, stating that “a 
 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues 
Emerging from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 497 (1998). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (1998). 
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lawyer’s failure to clarify whom the lawyer represents in 
circumstances calling for such a result might lead a lawyer to 
have entered into client-lawyer representations not intended by 
the lawyer.”61  The comment continues: 
Hence, the lawyer must clarify whom the lawyer intends to 
represent when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that, contrary to the lawyer’s own intention, a person, 
individual, or agents of the entity, on behalf of the entity, 
reasonably rely on the lawyer to provide legal services to that 
person or entity. . . . Such clarification may be required, for 
example, with respect to an officer of an entity client such as a 
corporation, with respect to one or more partners in a client 
partnership, or in the case of affiliated organizations such as a 
parent, subsidiary or similar organization related to that client 
person or entity.62 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also provide 
instruction on representation of individuals within a 
corporation.  Rule 1.13(d) provides that “[i]n dealing with an 
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members or other 
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client 
when it is apparent that the organization’s interests are 
adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is 
dealing.”63 
Both the Restatement and the Model Rules instruct a 
lawyer to clarify to individuals in a corporation that the entity 
is the client whom the lawyer represents and the individual is 
not.64  However, there is always a danger of an inadvertent 
representation.  One situation that may give rise to an 
inadvertent representation is an internal corporate 
investigation in response to a pending criminal or regulatory 
investigation.65  Corporate officers may not understand that 
inside counsel are not conducting interviews for the purpose of 
defending the officers, but rather to defend the corporation 
even if the corporation’s defense requires that counsel develop a 
case against the officers and later divulge the information 
about them to the authorities.66  Inside counsel must be 
especially sensitive to this misunderstanding if the attorney 
 
 61. Id. at cmt. f. 
 62. Id. 
 63. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(d) (2000). 
 64. See discussion supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Moore, supra note 57, at 502. 
 66. See id. at 502-03. 
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has frequent contact with an individual within the corporation 
or if the attorney reports to that person.67  It may be advisable 
to proffer a “corporate ‘Miranda’ warning” that informs the 
individual that his statements to corporate counsel may be 
used against him in a court of law.68 
Although corporate investigations may give rise to 
misunderstandings as to whom the attorney is representing, 
these situations are not the only ones in which inadvertent 
representations can exist.69  The line between the position of an 
advising attorney and a fellow corporate employee is often 
blurred for inside counsel when they participate in drafting 
employment agreements and compensation plans for 
management, when they provide assistance in exercising of 
stock options, and when they advise on the purchase or sale of 
securities and other filings.70  Inside counsel may view these 
services as simply acting on the company’s behalf; however, 
failing to clarify who is the client and the nature of the 
representation at the outset may lead to the formation of an 
inadvertent attorney-client relationship with an individual.71 
Further blurring of the line between representing an 
individual and representing the corporation can occur when 
inside counsel is called on to represent individuals within the 
corporation, such as directors, officers, employees, members, or 
shareholders.  As discussed above,72  Model Rule 1.7 controls 
when an attorney faces potential or actual conflicts of interest 
in representing both the corporation and an employee.73  If 
consent is permissible to cure the potential conflict, the consent 
by the corporation must be given by an individual distinct from 
the employee who is being represented.74  For example, a CEO 
whose interests may diverge from that of the corporation is not 
 
 67. See id. at 503. 
 68. See id. (internal citation omitted).  See also D.C. Bar Ethics 
Committee, Op. 269 (“A lawyer retained by a corporation to conduct an 
internal investigation represents the corporation only, and not any of its 
constituents, such as officers or employees. Corporate constituents have no 
right of confidentiality as regards communications with the lawyer, but the 
lawyer must advise them of his position as counsel to the corporation in the 
event of any ambiguity as to his role.”) 
 69. See Moore, supra note 57, at 505. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See discussion supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 73. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (2000). 
 74. See The Ethics of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in ETHICAL 
LITIGATION § 10.3 (1997). 
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permitted to consent to the representation on behalf of the 
corporation. 
In sum, inside counsel must be vigilant in articulating 
their position as representatives for the corporate entity and 
not the employee.  Since officers who have daily interaction 
with inside counsel may assume that counsel’s advice applies to 
them personally, the duty is on the counsel to guard against 
this misunderstanding and avoid any inadvertent 
representations. 
 
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BEFORE THE PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
 
An attorney who practices before the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), specializing in drafting patents 
in a specific technological field, may find himself caught in a 
baffling conflict of interest.  The Federal Regulations, 
governing procedures before the PTO, require disclosure by the 
inventor or his attorney of any information known to either of 
them and material to the prosecution of a patent application.75  
Meanwhile, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct prohibits an attorney from revealing the confidential 
information of his client.76  The PTO Code (“Code”) also requires 
that an attorney preserve “the confidences and secrets of a 
client.”77  The Code defines “confidences” as “information 
protected by the attorney-client or agent-client privilege under 
applicable law.”78  Under the Code, “‘secret’ refers to other 
information gained in the professional relationship that the 
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which 
 
 75. See 37 C.F.R. 1.56 (2000).  The duty of candor established in this 
provision reads in pertinent part:0 
Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent 
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the 
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information 
known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in 
this section . . .  
(c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent 
application within the meaning of this section are: 
(1) Each inventor named in the application; 
(2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the 
application . . . . 
Id. 
 76. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2000). 
 77. 37 C.F.R. 10.56 (2000). 
 78. 37 C.F.R. 10.57(a) (2000). 
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would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to 
the client.”79  Unless the client consents, the attorney is not 
permitted to disclose the secrets or confidences or use them to 
the disadvantage of the client. 
Although the duty to disclose and the requirement to keep 
client confidences often dovetail, they diverge when an attorney 
possesses confidential information from one client that also 
happens to be material to the prosecution of a patent for 
another client.80  This divergence is especially critical because a 
patent prosecuted without full disclosure by the attorney may 
be unenforceable.  Specifically, the Federal Regulations explain 
that it is “misconduct” for an attorney to “engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”81  
This “conduct” is defined as “knowingly giving false or 
misleading information or knowingly participating in a 
material way in giving false or misleading information to the 
PTO,”82 as well as “knowingly violating or causing to be violated 
the requirements of 37 C.F.R. 1.56.”83 
If an attorney is unable to disclose client confidences or 
secrets because the client prohibits the attorney from divulging 
this information, but the attorney is duty-bound to disclose the 
 
 79. See id.  The PTO Code also provides that: 
(a) A practitioner shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of 
the practitioner’s independent professional judgment in behalf of a client 
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the 
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve the practitioner 
in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under 
paragraph (c) of this section; 
(b) A practitioner shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise 
of the practitioner’s independent professional judgment in behalf of a 
client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the practitioner’s 
representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve the 
practitioner in representing differing interests, except to the extent 
permitted under paragraph (c) of this section; 
(c) In the situations covered by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section a 
practitioner may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that the 
practitioner can adequately represent the interest of each and if each 
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect 
of such representation on the exercise of the practitioner’s independent 
professional judgment on behalf of each. 
37 C.F.R. 10.66(a)-(c) (2000). 
 80. See David Hricik, The Risks and Responsibilities of Attorneys and 
Firms Prosecuting Patents for Different Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 332-34 (2000). 
 81. 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(4). 
 82. 37 C.F.R. 10.23(c)(2)(ii). 
 83. 37 C.F.R. 10.23(c)(10). 
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information in order to fulfill his duty of candor to the PTO, the 
attorney must withdraw from the representation.84  An 
attorney does not have the option to continue prosecuting a 
patent application while failing to disclose his actual material 
knowledge, even though this information may be the secret or 
confidential information of another client.85 
This difficulty is particularly germane to a lawyer whose 
practice is focused in particular forms of business activity, such 
as the dot.com world.  He will have access to the technical 
information of various companies, each of which will be seeking 
a technological edge against the others, through patenting or 
convenience of use, or both.  When one client proposes to patent 
its technical solution to an internet problem, and the lawyer 
has already seen a similar solution being proposed or 
implemented at another dot.com enterprise, his ethical 
dilemma as to each client is insoluble.  Must he tell the first 
client what he has seen at the second client’s facility?  Must he 
tell the second client of the first client’s plan to patent their 
technology?  Must he tell the PTO of the second client’s prior 
use?  How can he sit in a meeting listening to the first client’s 





The rules of ethics represent an effort by lawyers, thinking 
abstractly, to define what the public should be able to expect 
from the counsel they retain.  Those expectations may be 
compromised by a lawyer’s eagerness to sign a new client or 
increase his family’s standard of living.  Admittedly, it is not 
always easy for a lawyer to do the right thing.  There is novelty 
and excitement to signing a new client.  The prospect of 
financial prosperity is a powerful motivator.  However, 
situations arise in which a lawyer must carefully evaluate a 
prospective advantage against his own ability to provide 
forthright advice.  The rules of ethics help guide a lawyer in 
periods of weakness, insuring that obligations to existing 
clients are not overcome and that a lawyer will remain 
independent in providing a professional opinion.  Although the 
dot.com phenomenon has presented its own ethical pitfalls, the 
 
 84. See Hricik, supra note 80, at 344. 
 85. See id. 
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rules of ethics should serve the same role in this culture as in 
the more traditional settings, in guiding attorneys away from 
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit a 
lawyer from acquiring an ownership interest in a client, either 
in lieu of a cash fee for providing legal services or as an 
investment opportunity in connection with such services, as long 
as the lawyer complies with Rule 1.8(a) governing business 
transactions with clients, and, when applicable, with Rule 1.5 
requiring that a fee for legal services be reasonable.  To comply 
with Rule 1.8(a), the transaction by which the lawyer acquires 
the interest and its terms must be fair and reasonable to the 
client, and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a 
manner that can be reasonably understood by the client. The 
client also must be given a reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advice of independent counsel in the transaction and must 
consent to the transaction in writing.  In providing legal services 
to the client’s business while owning its stock, the lawyer must 
take care to avoid conflicts between the client’s interests and the 
lawyer’s personal economic interests as an owner, as required by 
Rule 1.7(b), and must exercise independent professional 
judgment in advising the client concerning legal matters as 
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With growing frequency, lawyers who provide legal 
services to start-up businesses are investing in their clients, 
sometimes accepting an ownership interest as a part or all of 
the fee.1  Some representatives of the organized bar have 
questioned this practice.2  Many lawyers nevertheless believe 
that acquiring ownership interests in start-up business clients 
is desirable in order to satisfy client needs and also, because of 
growing competition with higher paying venture capital and 
investment firms, to attract and retain partners and 
associates.3  From the client’s perspective, the lawyer’s 
willingness to invest with entrepreneurs in a start-up company 
frequently is viewed as a vote of confidence in the enterprise’s 
prospects.  Moreover, a lawyer’s willingness to accept stock 
instead of a cash fee may be the only way for a cash-poor client 
to obtain competent legal advice.  Frequently, this may be the 
determining factor in the client’s selection of a lawyer.4 
The Committee in this Opinion examines the issues that 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance and 
Incentives Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Lawyers, 1999 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329, 330-31; Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a 
Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. JOURNAL, February 2000, at 36, 37. Although the 
interest the lawyer acquires usually is in the form of stock or warrants or 
options to buy stock of a corporation, this Opinion applies equally to ownership 
in any form of business entity, such as a limited liability company, limited 
partnership, or business trust that is the client of the lawyer. For convenience, 
this Opinion assumes the ownership interest is comprised of corporate stock. 
 2. See, e.g., ABA Commission on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public 
Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986), in 
which the Commission identified lawyers investing in the activities of clients 
as one of several problem areas.  The Commission expressed the view that 
lawyers investing in clients “may make the client’s financing efforts easier, 
[but that] it creates a potential or actual conflict of interest, changing the 
lawyer-client relationship in a very fundamental way.”  Id. at 31 (footnotes 
omitted).  See also ABA Section of Litigation Task Force on the Independent 
Lawyer, Taking an Interest in the Client’s Business in Lieu of a Fee (Draft 
August 1999); Baker, supra note 1, at 39-40. 
 3. See, e.g., Sean Somerville, Lawyers Stocking Up on Payday, 
BALTIMORE SUN, November 7, 1999, at D-1.  See also Shawn Neidorf, Silicon 
Valley Lawyers Embrace VC-Like Role, VENTURE CAPITAL J., Oct. 1, 1999, at 
1, 2 (“Most Silicon Valley attorneys defer billing, with many offering discounts 
for the opportunity to invest in a client’s company through a law firm’s fund.”). 
 4. Klein, supra note 1, at 351, also argues that compensating lawyers 
with equity interests finds support in public policy.  Similar to contingent fees, 
permitting clients to pay with stock or options creates a financing device that 
allows clients broader access to legal services by providing an alternative 
currency to pay for those services. 
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must be addressed under the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct when a lawyer or law firm acquires an ownership 
interest in a client in connection with performing legal 
services.5  A typical situation might be one in which the client 
business is a corporation that the law firm is organizing at the 
request of the founding entrepreneurs.  The latter already have 
a few friends and family members who are eager to invest 
funds to start up the corporation.  The founders may allow the 
lawyer working with them to invest the firm’s fee for legal 
services in stock of the corporation.  The organizers expect the 
law firm to introduce them to the firm’s venture capital 
contacts and to continue representing the corporation, 
eventually performing the services necessary to take it public.6 
 
A. COMPLIANCE WITH RULES 1.8(a) AND 1.5(a) WHEN 
 ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP IN A CLIENT 
 
In our opinion, a lawyer who acquires stock in her client 
corporation in lieu of or in addition to a cash fee for her services 
enters into a business transaction with a client, such that the 
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) must be satisfied.7  In 
 
 5. The Committee notes that a lawyer considering the acquisition of 
ownership in a client should address practical issues as well as legal issues 
that arise under law other than the Model Rules when a lawyer owns an 
interest in a client.  Among these issues are: (1) extent of coverage under 
lawyer professional responsibility policies when the lawyer also is a 
stockholder; (2) possibility of civil liability claims, including stockholder 
derivative actions resulting from the lawyer representing the client in certain 
types of matters; (3) desirability of adopting clear policies on investing in 
clients in order to minimize liability risks and to avoid internal disharmony 
among lawyers in the firm regarding investment opportunities individual 
lawyers may be offered by clients; and (4) need for assuring compliance by all 
firm personnel with securities law and regulations. 
 6. We see no substantial difference under the Model Rules between 
direct payment to the lawyer of her fee by way of an interest in the business 
entity in lieu of cash and the opportunity to purchase an interest for cash, if 
the opportunity to acquire the stock would not have been offered had the 
lawyer not also undertaken to perform legal services. The same ethical issues 
also must be addressed whether the ownership interest is acquired directly by 
the lawyer or by an investment partnership controlled by the lawyer or 
members of her firm. 
 7. Rule 1.8(a) states in pertinent part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client . . . 
unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest 
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably 
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determining whether Rule 1.8(a)’s first requirement of fairness 
and reasonableness to the client is satisfied, the general 
standard of Rule 1.5(a) that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be 
reasonable” and the factors enumerated under that Rule are 
relevant.8 
For purposes of judging the fairness and reasonableness of 
the transaction and its terms, the Committee’s opinion is that, 
as when assessing the reasonableness of a contingent fee, only 
the circumstances reasonably ascertainable at the time of the 
transaction should be considered.9  It seems clear that “in a 
 
understood by the client; 
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
Authorities are in agreement that Rule 1.8(a) applies when a lawyer accepts 
an interest in the client in connection with a fee for legal services.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Official 
Draft 1998) § 126 cmt. a (requirements of § 126 apply when lawyer takes 
interest in client’s business as fee); see also G.C. HAZARD AND W.W. HODES, 
THE LAW OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1998) § 1.8:202 et seq.; C. WOLFRAM, MODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS (1986) § 8.11.2 (Model Rule 1.8(a) or former Code of 
Professional Responsibility DR 5-104(A) apply to the transaction).  Rule 1.8(a) 
does not, however, apply when the lawyer acquires the stock in an open 
market purchase or in other circumstances not involving direct intervention 
by the client. 
 8. Rule 1.5(a) states that: 
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
Rule 1.5 would not apply if the opportunity to invest was not offered in 
connection with undertaking to provide legal services. 
 9. See supra note 7, RESTATEMENT § 207 Cmt. e (“Fairness is determined 
based on facts that reasonably could be known at the time of the transaction, 
not as facts later develop.”).  See also ABA Formal Op. 94-389 (1994) 
(Contingent Fees), note 21 (finding various aspects of contingent fee 
arrangements to be ethical.  The note cites Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees 
Without Contingencies, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 87 (1989), to the effect that the 
legitimacy of a contingency fee is to be judged by the effort expected “prior to 
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discipline case, once proof has been introduced that the lawyer 
entered into a business transaction with a client, the burden of 
persuasion is on the lawyer to show that the transaction was 
fair and reasonable and that the client was adequately 
informed.”10  Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the lawyer to 
take account of all information reasonably ascertainable at the 
time when the agreement for stock acquisition is made.11 
Determining that the fee is reasonable in terms of the 
enumerated factors under Rule 1.5(a) does not resolve whether 
the requirement of Rule 1.8(a) that the transaction and terms 
be “fair and reasonable to the client” has been met.  
Determining “reasonableness” under both rules also involves 
making the often difficult determination of the market value of 
the stock at the time of the transaction.  As Professors Hazard 
and Hodes state, “one danger [to the lawyer who accepts stock 
as a fee] is that the business will so prosper that the fee will 
later appear unreasonably high.”12  Of course, instead of 
increasing in value, the stock may become worthless, as occurs 
frequently with start-up enterprises.13  The risk of failure and 
 
the commencement of representation,” not by the actual effort expended.) 
(Emphasis supplied); Klein, supra note 1, at 336 (“Review of the fee is only 
appropriate at the time the fee is granted, for the lawyer has undertaken 
100% of the risk associated with the value of that fee in the future.”). 
 10. See supra note 7, RESTATEMENT § 207 at 639; see also Cmt. e at 641-
42.  The transaction also remains voidable in a civil suit, and the lawyer 
investor, as a fiduciary, has the burden of proving its fairness.  See 
RESTATEMENT § 207 cmt. a; see also Passanate v. McWilliams, 53 Cal. App. 
4th 1240, 1248, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 298, 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (lawyer for 
corporation denied recovery of $32 million for stock of corporation that its 
board previously had authorized to be issued him in connection with his legal 
services because the lawyer failed to advise board to consult independent 
counsel about the transaction); Matthews v. Spears, 24 So. 2d 195 (La. App. 
1945) (court cancelled contract transferring to lawyer undivided one-fourth 
interest in mineral rights in land owned by clients on the grounds that the 
lawyer did not fully disclose the nature of the transaction and because 
consideration for the conveyance was lacking). 
 11. See also Comment [2] to Rule 1.5(a) stating that a fee paid in property 
(such as corporate stock) “may be subject to special scrutiny because it 
involves questions concerning both the value of the services and the lawyer’s 
special knowledge of the value of the property.”  Though the Comment is 
applicable here, meeting the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) serves to satisfy the 
special scrutiny standard applicable to the receipt of property in exchange for 
services. 
 12. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, §  1.8:202 at 264. 
 13. In comparing cash to stock compensation, Klein points out that “when 
a lawyer is compensated with stock or options rather than with cash, the 
lawyer accepts the risk or uncertainty in the value of the stock or options. . . . 
The risk in the future value of the stock or options is significant, because there 
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the stock’s nonmarketability are important factors that the 
lawyer must consider, along with all other information bearing 
on value that is reasonably ascertainable at the time when the 
agreement is made.14 
One way for the lawyer to minimize the risk noted by 
Professors Hazard and Hodes is to establish a reasonable fee 
for her services based on the factors enumerated under Rule 
1.5(a)15 and then accept stock that at the time of the transaction 
is worth the reasonable fee. Of course, the stock should, if 
feasible, be valued at the amount per share that cash investors, 
knowledgeable about its value, have agreed to pay for their 
stock about the same time. 
A reasonable fee also may include an agreed percentage of 
the stock issued or to be issued when the value of the shares is 
not reasonably ascertainable.  For example, if the lawyer is 
engaged by two founders who are contributing intellectual 
property for their stock, it may not be possible to establish with 
reasonable certainty the cash value of their contribution.  If so, 
it also would not be possible to establish with reasonable 
certainty the value of the shares to be issued to the lawyer 
retained to perform initial services for the corporation.  In such 
cases, the percentage of stock agreed upon should reflect the 
value, as perceived by the client and the lawyer at the time of 
the transaction, that the legal services will contribute to the 
potential success of the enterprise.  The value of the stock 
received by the lawyer will, like a contingent fee permitted 
under Rule 1.5(c), depend upon the success of the 
undertaking.16 
In addition to assuring that the stock transaction and its 
 
is no downside protection.”  Supra note 1, at 339-40. 
 14. See Utah Ethics Adv. Op. Comm Op. 98-13, 1998 WL 863904 * 1 (Dec. 
4, 1998) (in addition to factors enumerated under Rule 1.5(a), the lawyer also 
should consider in determining reasonableness of a fee when accepting client 
stock: (i) the liquidity of the stock, (ii) whether and when it can be expected to 
be publicly traded, (iii) any restrictions on its transfer, and (iv) its presently 
anticipated value, including the risks that a proposed patent or trademark 
may not be granted or necessary government approvals may not be received). 
 15. Supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 16. The Committee is aware that sometimes the lawyer will ask the 
corporation to issue her a percentage of the shares initially issued to the 
founders as a condition to the lawyer agreeing to become counsel to the new 
enterprise.  We take no position on the ethical propriety of this practice.  We 
caution, however, that in this circumstance, and especially if the cash value of 
the shares is not reasonably ascertainable, the lawyer should take special care 
to be in a position to justify the reasonableness of the total fee should it later 
be questioned as a violation of Rule 1.5(a). 
2001] APPENDIX  
 
79
terms are fair and reasonable to the client, compliance with 
Rule 1.8(a) also requires that the transaction and its terms 
must be fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner 
that can be reasonably understood by the client.17  Thus, the 
lawyer must be careful not only to set forth the terms in 
writing, but also to explain the transaction and its potential 
effects on the client-lawyer relationship in a way that the client 
can understand it.  For example, if the acquisition of stock by 
the lawyer will create rights under corporate by-laws or other 
agreements that will limit the client’s control of the 
corporation, the lawyer should discuss with the client the 
possible consequences of such an arrangement.18 
At the outset, the lawyer also should inform the client that 
events following the stock acquisition could create a conflict 
between the lawyer’s exercise of her independent professional 
judgment as a lawyer on behalf of the corporation and her 
desire to protect the value of her stock.19  She also should advise 
the client that as a consequence of such a conflict, she might 
feel constrained to withdraw as counsel for the corporation, or 
 
 17. As Professor Wolfram notes, “the fact that a transaction is arguably 
fair and reasonable does not mean that MR 1.8(a) has been complied with if 
the other requirements of the rule are not satisfied.”  WOLFRAM, supra note 7, 
§  8.11.4 at 480 (even though contract between client and lawyer was 
sufficiently fair and reasonable to decree specific performance, lawyer’s failure 
to make full disclosure of the transaction to client referred to disciplinary 
authority) (citing Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d, 
564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977)); Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State 
Bar Ass’n v. Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Iowa 1982) (violation of DR 5-
104(A) established “even though respondent did not act dishonestly or make a 
profit on the transaction”). 
 18. If the lawyer is acquiring a percentage of the equity or a class of 
securities that entitles her to exercise rights not shared by stockholders 
generally, then specific disclosure might be required.  See, e.g., Comm. on Prof. 
Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Humphreys, 524 N.W.2d 396, 
399 (Iowa 1994) (lawyer disbarred when, inter alia, without advising client-
majority stockholder of the potential conflict of interest, he acquired stock and 
prepared corporate documents that prevented the lawyer’s termination as a 
director and required the lawyer’s approval to reduce his compensation as an 
officer or to take certain other corporate actions).  As to the absolute right of a 
client to discharge the lawyer and the conflict created by differences over 
business decisions, see infra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text. 
 19. Rule 2.1 admonishes: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent judgment and render candid advice.”  See also Comment [6] 
under Rule 1.7 (“lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an 
adverse effect on representation of a client”); HAZARD & HODES supra note 7, §  
1.8:202 at 264 (“Another danger is that the business will falter, and that [the 
lawyer], worried about recovering her fee [stock rather than cash] for work 
already performed, will not be able to advise the client dispassionately.”). 
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at least to recommend that another lawyer advise the client on 
the matter regarding which she has a personal conflict of 
interest.20 
Full disclosure also includes specifying in writing the scope 
of the services to be performed in return for receipt of the stock 
or the opportunity to invest.  The scope of services should be 
covered in the written transmission to the client even though 
the stock is acquired by the firm’s investment partnership as 
an opportunity rather than by the firm directly as a part of the 
fee in lieu of cash.  If the client’s understanding is that the 
lawyer keeps the stock interest regardless of the amount of 
legal services performed by the lawyer and solely to assure the 
lawyer’s availability, it is important to set forth this aspect of 
the transaction in clear terms.21  Otherwise, a court might 
regard the stock acquisition as being in the nature of an 
advance fee for services and require part of the stock to be 
returned if all the work originally contemplated as part of the 
services for which the stock was given has not been 
performed.22 
Although it is better practice to set forth all the salient 
features of the transaction in a written document, compliance 
with Rule 1.8(a) does not require reiteration of details that the 
client already knows from other sources.  Indeed, too much 
detail may tend to distract attention from the material terms.  
Nonetheless, the lawyer bears the risk of omitting a term that 
 
 20. See infra note 31 and accompanying text regarding actions the lawyer 
must take should a conflict later arise. 
 21. See Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp. 
Formal Op. 95-100, 1995 WL 902545 *3 (August 1, 1995) (non-refundable 
retainers permissible so long as confirmed by “clear and unambiguous 
language of a written statement provided to the client or a written agreement 
between the attorney and client”). 
 22. Even though in such a case a court might not order disgorgement of 
the fee in a civil action if the client ends the relationship without cause, see, 
e.g., Ryan v. Butera et al., 193 F.3d 210, 218 (3rd Cir. 1999), the lawyer’s 
ethics might be questioned for failure to return the “unearned” portion of the 
stock acquired by the lawyer.  See also Oregon State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Gov. 
Formal Op. 1998-151, 1998 WL 717731 *2 (July 1998) (lawyer must return pro 
rata portion of fixed fee, even though specified as “earned on receipt,” if 
representation ends before lawyer performs all the work); District of Columbia 
Bar Op. 264 (1996) (“special retainers or fee advances in this jurisdiction must 
be refundable,” at least where “tied directly to provision of legal services, 
rather than designed solely to ensure availability”); In re Cooperman, 83 
N.Y.2d 465, 475, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1073, 611 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (N.Y. 1994) 
(“non-refundable retainer fee agreement clashes with public policy because it 
inappropriately compromises the right to sever the fiduciary services 
relationship with the lawyer”). 
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seems unimportant at the time, but later becomes significant 
because she has the burden of showing reasonable compliance 
with Rule 1.8(a)(1). A good faith effort to explain in 
understandable language the important features of the 
particular arrangement and its material consequences as far as 
reasonably can be ascertained at the time of the stock 
acquisition should satisfy the full disclosure requirements of 
Rule 1.8(a).23 
The client also must have a reasonable opportunity to seek 
the advice of independent counsel in the transaction and must 
consent in writing to the transaction and its terms.  In 
addition, although not required by the Model Rules, the written 
documentation of the transaction should include the lawyer’s 
recommendation to obtain such advice.  This serves to 
emphasize the importance to the client of obtaining 
independent advice.  The client’s failure to do so then is his own 
deliberate choice.  The lawyer has complied with Rule 1.8(a) in 
this respect because actual consultation is not required.24 
The best way to comply with the requirements of Rule 
1.8(a) is to set forth the salient terms of the transaction in a 
document written in language that the client can understand 
and, after the client has had an opportunity to consult with 
independent counsel, to have the document signed by both 
client and lawyer. 
 
B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE LAWYER’S INTERESTS AND THOSE 
 OF THE CLIENT 
 
On rare occasions the acquisition of stock in a client 
corporation will amount to acquiring, in the language of Rule 
 
 23. Professor Wolfram describes the elements constituting full disclosure 
applicable generally to business dealings with clients as follows: 
(1) the nature of the transaction and each of its terms; (2) the nature and 
extent of the lawyer’s interest in the transaction; (3) the ways in which 
the lawyer’s participation in the transaction might affect the lawyer’s 
exercise of professional judgment in concurrent legal work for the client, 
if any; (4) the desirability of the client’s seeking independent legal advice 
if the client is not already independently represented; and (5) the nature 
of the respective risks and advantages to each of the parties to the 
transaction. 
WOLFRAM, supra note 7, §  8.11.4 at 485 (footnotes omitted). 
 24. When a client declines to obtain the advice of independent counsel or 
chooses to seek financial advice instead, the lawyer also may wish to confirm 
this in writing. 
82 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:73 
 
1.8(j), “a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject 
matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting.”25  As Comment 
[7] under Rule 1.8 explains, the prohibition “has its basis in 
common law champerty and maintenance [and] is subject to 
specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in 
these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent 
fees set forth in Rule 1.5 . . . .”  The modern rationale for the 
rule is the concern that a lawyer acquiring less than all of a 
client’s cause of action creates so severe a conflict between the 
lawyer’s interest and the client’s interest that it is 
nonconsentable.26 
In our view, when the corporation has as its only 
substantial asset a claim or property right (such as a license), 
title to which is contested in a pending or impending lawsuit in 
which the lawyer represents the corporation, Rule 1.8(j) might 
be applicable to the acquisition of the corporation’s stock in 
connection with the provision of legal services.  If the 
acquisition of the stock constitutes a reasonable contingent fee, 
however, Rule 1.8(j) would not prohibit acquisition of the 
stock.27 
 
 25. Rule 1.8(j) states: 
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or 
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except 
that the lawyer may: 
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; 
and 
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. 
 26. Professor Wolfram, in condemning Rule 1.8(j) as unnecessary, 
nevertheless notes: “[a] purchase of a partial interest, of course, does present 
the possibility that the lawyer will not seek and accept client guidance on 
major decisions in the lawsuit because of the lawyer’s own economic interest in 
the outcome.”  WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 8.13 at 492.  The Committee believes 
that the failure to consult with the client and accept the client’s decision as 
posited by Professor Wolfram would violate Rule 1.2(a) and Rule 1.7(b), 
discussed in the next part of this Opinion.  As Professor Wolfram suggests, no 
flat prohibition against a lawyer’s purchase of an interest in a client’s cause of 
action is needed “so long as the client consents and the transaction is fair and 
reasonable.”  Id.  Of course, because this constitutes a business transaction 
with a client, the lawyer also must fully comply with all the other 
requirements of Rule 1.8(a) as discussed earlier in this Opinion. 
 27. See District of Columbia Bar Op. 179 (1987) (under DR 5-103(A), 
though acquiring stock in a corporation the lawyer represented in an FCC 
license application amounted to acquiring an interest in the client’s license 
proceeding, no disciplinary rule is violated by the lawyer in “accepting a 
reasonable contingent fee that takes the form of a small and noncontrolling 
equity interest in the client”). The District of Columbia’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct, later adopted, do not contain Rule 1.8(j) or any other specific 
prohibition against acquiring an interest in litigation. Of course, Rule 1.8(j) 
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Rule 1.7(b) prohibits representation of a client if the 
representation “may be materially limited . . . by the lawyer’s 
own interests,” unless two requirements are met. The lawyer 
must reasonably believe that “the representation will not be 
adversely affected,” and the client must consent to the 
representation after consultation.28 
A lawyer’s representation of a corporation in which she 
owns stock creates no inherent conflict of interest under Rule 
1.7.  Indeed, management’s role primarily is to enhance the 
business’s value for the stockholders.  Thus, the lawyer’s legal 
services in assisting management usually will be consistent 
with the lawyer’s stock ownership. In some circumstances, such 
as the merger of one corporation in which the lawyer owns 
stock into a larger entity, the lawyer’s economic incentive to 
complete the transaction may even be enhanced.29 
There may, however, be other circumstances in which the 
lawyer’s ownership of stock in her corporate client conflicts 
with her responsibilities as the corporation’s lawyer.  For 
example, the lawyer might have a duty when rendering an 
opinion on behalf of the corporation in a venture capital 
transaction to call upon corporate management to reveal 
material adverse financial information that is being withheld, 
even though the revelation might cause the venture capital 
 
also would apply were the stock itself subject to a claim in which the lawyer 
represents the corporation or other stockholders. See Kansas Bar Assn. Op. 
98-06 (Sept. 15, 1998) (contracts regarding corporate stock that is the subject 
of litigation are not per se unethical, depending on the circumstances in the 
case). 
 28. Rule 1.7(b) states: 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, 
unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected: and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall 
include explanation of the implications of the common representation 
and the advantages and risks involved. 
 29. See Klein, supra note 1, at 355-56 suggesting stock ownership as an 
incentive that is in furtherance of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to her 
corporate client.  Ownership of corporate client stock should not create a 
conflict with the corporate client’s interests because the lawyer’s duty of 
loyalty is to the corporation.  Rule 1.13(a) states: “A lawyer employed or 
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its 
duly authorized representatives.” 
84 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:73 
 
investor to withdraw.30  In that circumstance, the lawyer must 
evaluate her ability to maintain the requisite professional 
independence as a lawyer in the corporate client’s best interest 
by subordinating any economic incentive arising from her stock 
ownership.  The lawyer also must consider whether her stock 
ownership might create questions concerning the objectivity of 
her opinion. She must consult with her client and obtain 
consent if the representation may be materially limited by her 
stock ownership. 
The conflict could be more severe.  For example, the stock 
of the client might be the lawyer’s major asset so that the 
failure of the venture capital opportunity could create a serious 
financial loss to her.  The lawyer’s self-interest in such a case 
probably justifies a reasonable belief that her representation of 
the corporation would be affected adversely.  This would 
disqualify her under Rule 1.7(b) from providing the opinion 
even were the client to consent.31 
 
 30. Rule 2.3 applies to legal evaluations made for the use of others and 
states: 
(a) A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client 
for the use of someone other than the client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is 
compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the 
client; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. 
(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an 
evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected 
by Rule 1.6. 
As Comment [4] cautions: “The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of 
professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other 
functions undertaken in behalf of the client.”  When making an evaluation 
under Rule 2.3, the lawyer should establish with the client in the beginning 
the types of information that will be revealed and any information that must 
be withheld.  See Comment [5] (“The quality of an evaluation depends on the 
freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based.”). 
 31. See Rule 1.7, Comment [4] (“Loyalty to a client is . . . impaired when a 
lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of 
action for the client because of the lawyer’s other . . . interests. The conflict in 
effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.”).  
See also Utah Ethics Adv. Op. Comm Op. 98-13, supra note 14 (quoting 
Comment [4]).  A lawyer who owns stock in a client corporation may, in 
circumstances where her disagreement with some transaction approved by the 
corporation’s board limits her ability to provide independent professional 
advice to management, call upon another firm lawyer who is not so limited to 
advise the client respecting the transaction.  In such a circumstance, the 
lawyer-stockholder must obtain consent of the client pursuant to Rule 1.7(b) to 
avoid imputed disqualification of other lawyers in the firm under Rule 1.10(a).  
When the probity of the lawyer’s own conduct is questioned, however, better 
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In order to minimize conflicts with the interests of the 
clients such as those described, some law firms have adopted 
policies governing investments in clients.  These policies may 
include limiting the investment to an insubstantial percentage 
of stock and the amount invested in any single client to a 
nonmaterial sum.  The policies also may require that decisions 
regarding a firm lawyer’s potential client conflict be made by 
someone other than the lawyer with the principal client contact 
(who also may have a larger stock interest in the corporate 
client) and may also transfer billing or supervisory 
responsibility to a partner with no stock ownership in the 
client.32 
Even though a lawyer owns stock in a corporation, she, of 
course, has no right to continue to represent it as a lawyer if 
the corporate client discharges her.33  Were the lawyer to 
challenge the decision duly made by the authorized corporate 
constituents to discharge her, she would violate Rule 1.7(b) 
because it is clear that her own interests adversely affect the 
 
practice calls for independent counsel to advise the client.  See Comment [6] 
under Rule 1.7 (“The lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have 
an adverse effect on representation of a client.”).  See also ABA Formal Op. 98-
410 (1998) (Lawyer Serving as Director of Client Corporation) at 9-10; Peter 
Geraghty, ASK ETHICSearch, in THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 21 (Fall 1999) 
(citing other examples of conflicts between a lawyer’s interest as owner of 
client property and the interests of the client). 
 32. Other law firm policies regarding investments in clients also include 
some of the following: (1) No lawyer may invest in or with any firm client 
without prior executive committee approval, sometimes excepting purchases 
in de minimis amounts in a private placement or open market purchase; and 
(2) Investments in nonpublic clients offered firm lawyers are to be allotted 
among partners (or all firm lawyers) as investment opportunities, or may be 
placed in a pooled investment fund or allocated to a bonus plan.  Reminders to 
avoid securities violations, including Section 10-b-5 (anti-fraud) and Section 16 
(short swing profits), and mechanisms to avoid insider trading also are 
frequently included. 
 33. Rule 1.16(a)(3) states in pertinent part that “a lawyer shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw 
from the representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is discharged.”  See also 
Comment [4]. The decision to discharge the lawyer is made by the corporation 
“acting through its duly authorized constituents,” usually its chief executive or 
more likely the Board of Directors in this circumstance.  See Rule 1.13(a), 
supra note 29.  Sometimes authority to discharge counsel is vested in the 
stockholders giving rise to the question whether a lawyer who is a stockholder 
may ethically vote as a stockholder to retain her firm.  Once the decision is 
duly made, however, the client’s right to discharge a lawyer is absolute.  
Whether because of contract the lawyer may recover damages for her 
discharge is a matter of law beyond the scope of an ethics opinion. 
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When a lawyer accepts stock or options to acquire stock in 
a client corporation in connection with providing legal services 
to it, she must comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) 
because the stock acquisition constitutes a business transaction 
with a client and if applicable, with the requirement of Rule 
1.5(a) that the lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.  Under Rule 
1.8(a), the stock transaction and its terms must be fair and 
reasonable to the client.  This is satisfied if the fee, including 
receipt of the stock, is reasonable applying the enumerated 
factors under Rule 1.5(a), and if the transaction and its terms 
in other respects are fair and reasonable to the client under the 
circumstances that are reasonably ascertainable at the time the 
arrangement is made. 
The terms of the transaction also must be fully disclosed in 
writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably 
understood by the client.  Full disclosure includes, for example, 
discussions of the consequences of any rights by virtue of the 
lawyer’s stock ownership that may limit the client’s control of 
the corporation under special corporate by-laws or other 
agreements and the possibility that the lawyer’s economic 
interests as a stockholder could create a conflict with the 
client’s interest that might necessitate the lawyer’s withdrawal 
from representation in a matter.  The client also must be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult independent 
counsel concerning the transaction and its terms.  Finally, the 
client’s consent must be in writing. 
Although a lawyer’s representation of a corporation in 
which the lawyer owns stock creates no inherent conflict of 
interest, circumstances may arise that create a conflict between 
the corporation’s interests and the lawyer’s economic interest 
 
 34. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n, 
524 N.W.2d at 398.  A lawyer who no longer represents a client whose stock 
she owns must remember that a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(b) may 
arise if another client seeks representation on a matter adverse to the former 
client.  The law firm in seeking the new client’s consent may need to disclose 
not only the earlier client-lawyer relationship, but also the investment 
relationship if it is material.  Of course, if the stock value is so high or subject 
to such risk from the second client’s matter that it would not be reasonable to 
conclude that the representation would not be affected adversely, the lawyer 
must decline the representation. 
2001] APPENDIX  
 
87
as a stockholder. In such event, the lawyer must consult with 
the client and obtain client consent if, as a result of her 
ownership interest, the representation of the corporation in a 
particular matter may be materially limited.  The lawyer may 
in some circumstances be required under Rule 1.7(b) to 
withdraw from representing the client in a matter if her 
financial interest in the client is such that she cannot 
reasonably conclude that the representation would not be 
adversely affected. 
 
 

